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Implementing Full and Partial 
Work Sanctions
The Case of Texas
Vicki Lens
Columbia University
This study examines the implementation of work sanctions in Texas, a state that switched from
partial to full benefit sanctions. A qualitative research design is used consisting of 255 indi-
vidual case studies obtained from administrative fair hearing data under Texas’s full and par-
tial sanction regimes. Recipients’ explanations for not complying with the work rules and how
workers assessed these explanations and whether sanctions were appropriate are examined.
This study found that recipients’ reasons for not complying with work rules were similar for
both full and partial sanctions. The primary reasons for their noncompliance were family
obstacles and situational challenges or lack of notice. Workers responses under both regimes
were also very similar, with workers using their discretion to apply sanctions punitively. Workers
focused on the paper-processing tasks of sanctioning rather than the larger goal of encouraging
self-sufficiency, with workers failing to distinguish between procedural and substantive viola-
tions of the work rules.
Keywords: welfare reform; sanctions; fair hearings
Welfare reform’s foundation is built on behavioral-based reforms that mandate workfor the adult members of families receiving public assistance. The primary means for
enforcing work are sanctions, which are financial penalties imposed on recipients for vio-
lating work rules. Most states impose full family sanctions instead of partial sanctions,
although the latter are permitted under federal law. Specifically, 44 states impose some
form of full family sanction, cutting the entire family, including children, off from aid either
immediately or gradually when an adult member violates a work rule (Kauff, Derr, Pavetti,
& Martin, 2007). The overall trend is toward stricter sanctions. In 2003, 14 states imposed
partial sanctions, where only the noncompliant adult’s portion of the grant was eliminated
(Pavetti, 2003). Currently only six states, including the two states with the largest popula-
tion of welfare recipients (California and New York), impose a partial sanction (Kauff et al.,
2007). Texas initially imposed partial sanctions, but then switched to full family sanctions
in 2003.
Some argue that sanctions, especially full family sanctions, are the key to transforming
welfare from an income-maintenance-system to a work-based system (Mead, 2001; Rector
& Youssef, 1999). They encourage unwilling recipients to participate in work activities
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(Kauff et al., 2007), while reducing “incentives for idleness” and preparing recipients “for
the real world of employment” (Rector & Youssef, 1999, p. 8). Others contend that sanc-
tions are more punitive than rehabilitative, designed to reduce caseloads rather than restore
self-sufficiency (Hasenfeld & Weaver, 1996; Houser, Schram, Fording, & Soss, 2007). The
focus on recipients’ behaviors and personal deficiencies can hinder rather than help by
obscuring obstacles to work and problems in the low-wage market (Brodkin, 2006a).
Sanctions are imposed by frontline workers and require the exercise of discretion because
they involve subjective determination of recipients’ willingness to work or reasons for not
working. Few studies, however, have explored the exercise of discretion in the application
of sanctions. Comparisons between partial and full family sanctions are also lacking.
This study seeks to fill this gap by examining how full and partial sanctions are admin-
istered on the front lines. It focuses on Texas, which shifted from partial to full family sanc-
tions in 2003. It thus takes advantage of this rare opportunity to compare the implementation
of partial and full sanctions in the same welfare bureaucracy. It builds on earlier research
by this author examining how partial sanctions were applied in Texas. A qualitative research
design is used consisting of 255 individual case studies obtained from administrative fair
hearing data under Texas’s full and partial sanction regimes. Recipients’ explanations for
not complying with the work rules and how workers assessed these explanations and
whether sanctions were appropriate are examined.
Sanctions, Discretion, and Welfare Bureaucracies
Both laws and discretion drive bureaucracies, as workers apply broad and sometimes
ambiguous laws and regulations to specific cases. The use or misuse of discretion has long
bedeviled welfare bureaucracies. In the 1960s, frontline workers were criticized both for
using their discretion too leniently and too stringently and for being either too generous or
too demanding of clients (Brodkin, 2006b). Reforms designed to limit discretion by impos-
ing more rules and supervision ended up “redirect[ing] discretion from a need-based to a
more procedurally based set of informal practices” (Brodkin, 2006b, p. 5). It created what
Kane and Bane (1994) termed an eligibility-compliance culture, with workers focused on
procedural rules and paperwork rather than the helping relationship. Discussions about
individual needs were replaced with demands for documents. As workers and clients filled
out and secured an escalating number of standardized forms and documents, interactions
became depersonalized and individual need obscured or overlooked (Brodkin, 1986).
Mistakes were often made, resulting in bureaucratic disentitlement or the denial of aid to
otherwise eligible people based on process rather than substance (Lipsky, 1984). This
undue emphasis on proceduralism subverted policy goals when aid was denied to welfare’s
intended beneficiaries.
The 1996 welfare reform has reshaped again how workers use their discretion. The law
provides for a complex mix of coercion and support, flexibility, and regimentation.
Encouraging self-sufficiency is a more complex task than verifying eligibility. Recognizing
this, the law gives states unprecedented flexibility in program design for moving people into
work. Many programs use the social work or case management model, which emphasizes
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flexibility and personalized services (Segal, Gerdes, & Steiner, 2004). Funding for an array
of support services, including day care, transportation, and job training, gives workers oppor-
tunities to exercise their discretion positively. For example, job search and training could be
tailored to clients’ abilities and preferences with workers seeking the best match.
On the other hand, welfare reform also encourages rigidity and routinization. The
emphasis on work quotas provides incentives for workers to assign clients to standardized
work activities (Brodkin, 2006b). The work first approach, which calls for immediate labor
market attachment, also encourages depersonalized service (Anderson, 2001). Even among
private welfare-to-work contractors, financial inducements in contracts inhibit workers
from providing individualized service (Johnson Dias & Maynard-Moody, 2007).
Sanctions, an inherently discretionary tool, can be applied in different ways. Because all
states permit clients to avoid sanctions if they have “good cause” for not complying with
work rules, sanctions often require individualized, and hence discretionary, determinations
(State Policy Documentation Project, 2001). States have adopted various criteria, some
more specific than others, to determine good cause. Some examples of good cause include
ill health, a family crisis, child care difficulties, or lack of transportation (State Policy
Documentation Project, 2001). Workers must scrutinize clients’ reasons for not complying
for sufficiency and truth. Whether, for example, a particular family crisis qualifies or is true
is a discretionary determination requiring the application of law to facts.
However, discretion can be “exercised in routine and repetitive ways” (Hawkins, 2001,
p. 39). Individualized determinations take time and resources. Workers thus often develop
shortcuts to decision making, especially for frequently made decisions (Hawkins, 2001). Much
of the welfare population is now subject to sanctions, inviting abbreviated decision making.
A commonly used shortcut in welfare bureaucracies is to classify clients as morally unde-
serving, thus routinely interpreting their behavior negatively (Hasenfeld, 2000). As applied to
sanctions, regularly assuming clients are unwilling to work is simpler and easier than fully
assessing work behaviors and would represent a punitive approach to sanctions.
Organizational precedents and practices also shape the shortcuts developed by workers.
As described above, welfare bureaucracies are prone to “eligibility compliance-cultures,”
where processing papers takes precedence over processing people (Kane & Bane, 1994). A
rote reliance on procedural rules can make sanctions easier to impose. A missed appoint-
ment can serve as a quick and easy proxy for judging clients’ overall work behaviors, espe-
cially if punishment rather than rehabilitation is the guiding force. Workers may fail to
distinguish between procedural and substantive violations of the work rules. Workers also
respond to incentives (Brodkin, 2006b). If, for example, case records are checked for errors
of liberality, not stringency, workers will err on the side of the latter. Sanctions may become
the first resort rather than the last.
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families’ (TANF) organizational and other reforms were
designed to transform welfare centers into job centers with an array of personalized services
and supports. However, as numerous implementation studies have found, frontline practices
are difficult to change (Lurie, 2006; Lurie & Riccucci, 2003; Meyers & Dillon, 1999; Meyers,
Glaser, & MacDonald, 1998; Riccucci, Meyers, Lurie, & Han, 2004; Sandfort, 2000).
Frontline workers’ shared beliefs and collective knowledge about how things work can super-
sede management’s vision or directives (Sandfort, 2000). As Lurie (2006) found in a study
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that spanned four states, work mandates can be imposed in routine and impersonal ways that
undercut the larger vision infusing welfare reform. As she explains,
The sheer volume of information, rules, and forms forced workers to devote much of their time
to these routinized tasks and generated a vast amount of paperwork. Even delicate questions
that might justify an individual conversation, like inquiring whether the client faced a sub-
stance abuse problem that interfered with employment, frequently became a routinized task of
asking the client to sign a piece of paper. (p. 74)
Likewise, in a study of sanction processes that spanned eight counties in seven states,
researchers found that high case loads that discouraged frequent personal interactions
resulted in the mechanical application of sanctions without a full assessment of the factors
contributing to noncompliance (Kauff et al., 2007).
There is some suggestion that work barriers are paradoxically more likely to be ignored
among those clients who need the most help. Numerous studies have found that the most dis-
advantaged clients are most likely to be sanctioned. This includes recipients with lower levels
of education, less work experience, and with longer periods of time on public assistance (Born,
Caudill, & Cordero, 1999; Cherlin, Bogen, Quane, & Burton, 2002; Edelhoch, Liu, & Martin,
2000; Fein & Lee, 1999; Hasenfeld, Ghose, & Larson, 2004; Kalil, Seefeldt, & Wang, 2002;
Koralek, 2000; Mancuso & Lindler, 2001; Pavetti, Derr, Kirby, Wood, & Clark, 2004; Westra
& Routley, 2000; Wu, Cancian, Meyer, & Wallace, 2004), larger families headed by the never
married (Cherlin et al., 2002; Edelhoch et al., 2000; Fein & Lee, 1999; Hasenfeld et al., 2004;
Kalil et al., 2002; Koralek, 2000; Mancuso & Lindler, 2001; Pavetti et al., 2004; Westra &
Routley, 2000), and health problems, including alcohol and drug problems, and domestic vio-
lence (Cherlin et al., 2002; Kalil et al., 2002; Mancuso & Lindler, 2001; Pavetti et al., 2004;
Polit, London, & Martinez, 2001). Logistical problems, such as securing transportation or child
care, are also more frequent among sanctioned recipients (Cherlin et al., 2002; Hasenfeld et al.,
2004; Kalil et al., 2002; Mancuso & Lindler, 2001; Pavetti et al., 2004).
Sanctions create a disincentive for helping those clients most in need of welfare reform’s
enhanced supports because it is easier to sanction than provide support. Bell (2006) found
evidence of this dynamic in her study of frontline workers in Texas, who often dismissed
work barriers as exaggerated or the client’s fault, choosing to sanction rather than address
them. The easier route for workers is to standardize and bureaucratize sanctions, thus avoid-
ing the complex and time-consuming task of evaluating work behaviors and securing sup-
ports, especially among hard-to-serve clients.
Little is known about the frontline transactions between worker and client that culminate
in a sanction, including how workers assess (or fail to assess) clients’ “good cause” expla-
nations or ability to work and whether workers impose full and partial sanctions differently.
The few implementation studies rely largely on generalized information from administra-
tors and frontline workers, and to lesser extent clients, about sanction policies and proce-
dures (Brown, 1999; Fraker, Nixon, Losby, Prindle, & Else, 1997; Kauff et al., 2007;
Pavetti et al., 2004). These studies do not fully capture the complex mix of rules and dis-
cretion involved in the application of sanctions. This study, by focusing on individual cases
and both partial and full family sanctions, adds to our knowledge of how workers translate
this policy tool into practice.
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Data and Methodology
This study uses as a data source fair hearings, which are adversarial style administrative
hearings triggered when recipients appeal an adverse decision by the agency, including work
sanctions. Required since the inception of the Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program
in 1935, hearings correct errors in individual cases. They provide a novel and original source
for exploring areas of conflict between client and worker. Hearings offer a window into what
types of discretionary decisions clients choose to visibly contest at a particular time and
place. They thus provide an additional and different view of bureaucratic processes than
traditional implementation studies, which typically consist of interviews and observations of
workers in their day-to-day interactions with clients. In contrast, hearings focus on those
interactions that generate complaints. Although few clients appeal, those who do provide a
fertile source for exploring what types of practices or bureaucratic errors generate conflict,
thus leading to a fuller and more complex understanding of frontline interactions.
Hearings also have several advantages as a data source. They are especially useful for
examining how workers exercise their discretion in the context of the bureaucracy’s admin-
istrative processes. Deciding how the law should apply to a particular set of facts, for exam-
ple, whether a client’s reason for not complying with the work rules is legally sufficient,
requires the exercise of discretion. The fine points of this discretionary decision is scruti-
nized in the hearing process and contained in the hearing record.
Hearings also provide a thorough account of bureaucratic interactions from the perspec-
tive of both client and worker. The dictates of the adversarial process, including the presen-
tation of evidence by the client and agency, cross-examination of witnesses, and a written
decision by the hearing officer summarizing each side’s position and findings of fact and
law, provides a detailed administrative record of individual cases. Hearings also capture the
actions of the parties with the most knowledge of the interaction, while it is occurring, and
without any interference from a researcher. Thus, they reflect what people did, not what they
report doing, or recall having done, or may do or not when under observation. Unlike on-site
observations, which record only snippets of cases (see, e.g., Lurie, 2006), hearing data are
more contextual and comprehensive. In short, they tell a more complete story.
This study builds on an earlier study by the author (Lens, 2006), which used fair hear-
ing data to study the administration of partial work sanctions in Texas in 2002. Using the
same data source in 2004 to study full family sanctions provides an opportunity to contrast
different sanctioning policies in the same state and within the same bureaucracy, thus elim-
inating the inherent variation in cross-state comparisons and among different bureaucra-
cies. To more fully understand the structure and scope of the sanctioning process, these data
are supplemented with an analysis of the agency’s regulations, policies, and procedures
governing sanctions.
Two regions in Texas were chosen to provide a contrast between a primarily urban/
suburban area and a more rural area. The regions reflect geographical distinctions made by
the Texas Health and Human Services Commission, which divides the state into 10 separate
regions. One region is a well-populated urban/suburban region (hereinafter referred to as
the “urban/suburban region”) and the other is primarily rural, with no large cities (here-
inafter referred to as the “rural region”). In addition to these geographical distinctions, the
rural region, which shares a border with Mexico, has significantly higher rates of poverty
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than the urban/suburban region. For example, the poverty rate for single-parent female-
headed households in the largest city in the urban/suburban region (Dallas/Fort Worth) is
22.2%, whereas it is 47.6% in the rural region encompassed by McAllen, Edinburg, and
Mission (Census Profiles, 2000b). The ethnic composition of the two regions also differs.
Twenty-one percent of the population in the Dallas/Fort Worth area is Latino, compared
with 88% in McAllen, Edinburg, and Mission (Census Profiles, 2000a).
Texas’s Freedom of Information Law was used to request a random sample of every
other fair hearing decision on work rules issued in 2002 under the partial sanction regime.
The total sample was 178 decisions, with 109 decisions from the urban/suburban region
and 69 from the rural region. Because fewer hearings were held under the full family sanc-
tion regime (in part because of caseload declines between 2002 and 2004 and because in
the urban/suburban region more cases were settled prior to hearing), to obtain a sufficient
sample size all fair hearing decisions on work rules issued in 2004 were requested. The
total sample for full family sanctions was 77 decisions, with 38 decisions from the
urban/suburban region and 39 decisions from the rural region. The total sample for partial
and full family sanctions was thus 255.
Content analysis was used to analyze the decisions. First, the following data were
extracted verbatim from the decision and copied onto an excel spreadsheet: nature of work
rule violation, agency’s description of violation, recipient’s reason for not complying, and
hearing officer’s decision and rationale. Cases were grouped according to recipients’ rea-
sons for noncompliance under the following categories: medical or other exemption, lack
of notice of appointment date, family obstacles or situational challenges, administrative
error, and scheduling conflicts with work or school.
Coding was conducted using a framework that would capture the different ways work-
ers might exercise their discretion if they were to apply sanctions punitively rather than to
rehabilitate. This would include mechanizing and simplifying the application of sanctions.
Workers would fail to make a holistic assessment of clients’ needs or barriers to work,
instead relying on an excess form of proceduralism that elevates process over substance
(Brodkin, 1986; Kane & Bane, 1994; Lipsky, 1984). Goal displacement would occur as
workers focused on the paper-processing tasks of sanctioning rather than the larger goal of
encouraging self-sufficiency. Workers would choose to apply rules arbitrarily or rigidly, for
example, narrowly construing the definition of good cause for not complying with the work
rules. The following codes were developed based on the author’s (Lens, 2006) original
study of partial sanctions and applied here.
1. Failing to fully assess exemptions from the work rules. Included in this category were
allegations that recipients’ medical problems or other exemptions had been overlooked,
medical documentation ignored, or that a full assessment of their medical condition had
not been made.
2. Failing to fully assess, or construing narrowly, recipients’ reasons for not complying with
the work rules. Included in this category were allegations of clerical errors or bureaucratic
foul-ups (such as miscommunication, improper coding, premature sanctioning, and a
recipient’s failure to receive notice of appointments) or overlooking or ignoring personal
and family challenges (such as sickness, ill family members, unstable housing, or domes-
tic violence) or logistical and situational obstacles to work (such as child care or trans-
portation problems).
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3. Administering sanctions in a manner inconsistent with policy goals. Included in this cate-
gory were cases where a recipient was working or attending school when sanctioned.
The unit of analysis was the case, with either errors found by the hearing officer or recip-
ients’ allegations concerning agency practices used as a basis for applying the codes. Thus,
agency mistakes, as evidenced by the hearing officers’ reversal of a sanction and recipients’
allegations of practices that may or may not have resulted in reversal, were analyzed. The
latter was included because they highlight areas of dispute and contention involving work-
ers’ exercise of their discretion, notwithstanding the hearing officers’ failure to reverse the
sanction. For example, sanctioning a client for coming late to an appointment, which was
subsequently rescheduled, might not be a legal error, but is still indicative of the ways
workers exercise their discretion. Such a case would be coded “failing to fully assess, or
construing narrowly, clients’ reasons for not complying with the work rules.” (Whether such
practices resulted in reversible legal error is reported throughout the discussion of illustra-
tive case examples; reversal rates for all cases, categorized by reason for noncompliance,
are reported in Table 1.)
To assure reliability, for the partial sanction cases a research assistant conducted coding
on 15 cases from the urban region, with an intercoder reliability rating of more than 90%.
For the full family sanction cases, a research assistant coded all 39 cases from the rural
region. I then coded these cases, with an intercoder reliability rating of more than 90%.
Limitations
One limitation is that the data were only available by regions, each of which consisted
of multiple counties, local offices, and workforce boards. Thus, it was not possible to deter-
mine variations in practice among counties or local offices or to distinguish well-performing
offices from poorly performing ones.
Another limitation, shared by virtually all implementation studies, is the difficulty of
generalizing results across states because of the substantial flexibility permitted in program
design. Sanctions, however, are a universal tool used by all welfare offices and the experi-





Reason Partial Full Partial Full
Scheduling conflict with work or school 31% 33% 44% 50%
Agency error 73% 83% 61% 75%
Family obstacles; situational challenges 23% 8% 62% 33%
Nonreceipt of notice of date of appointment 38% 25% 55% 55%
Medical or other exemption 57% 55% 50% 44%
Overall 48% 36% 48% 49%
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Another limitation, noted above, is that this study is limited to a systematic exploration of
cases where sanctioning disputes occurred. Because few clients appeal (the appeal rate for
sanctions is 2.9% in Texas; Lens, 2006), the findings are not representative of all sanction
cases. This study is also limited to the exercise of negative discretion. Not captured by this
study are instances where workers exercised their discretion to not impose a sanction despite
a work rule violation; such a case would not trigger an appeal. A different methodological




Texas initiated its welfare to work program in 1996. The program, called Choices, empha-
sizes job readiness, search and placement services up front, with training and education
later (Capps, Pindus, Snyder, & Leos-Urbel, 2001). Responsibility for work programs were
devolved to outside agencies on the local level, where a network of local workforce devel-
opment boards contract with local service contractors (profit and nonprofit) to provide
work-related services and monitor recipients’ compliance.
Examples of work rule violations included failing to attend a workforce orientation or
job search activities or participate in community service assignments. Texas opted initially
to impose the more lenient partial sanction. Violations resulted in a grant reduction of $78
for failing to participate in Choices and $25 for voluntarily quitting a job (Texas Works
Handbook, n.d.). The maximum grant for a family of 3 was $208, thus a sanction reduced
the grant by more than a third. Minimum penalty periods also applied and were set at
1 month (or until the recipient complied, whichever was longer) for the first noncompliance
and then 3 and 6 months thereafter.
In September 2003, Texas switched to full family sanctions. “Pay for performance” as
Texas labels its sanction rules, requires that the entire family’s grant be eliminated when a
participating adult fails to comply with the work rules. Sanctions are no longer durational,
but recipients must demonstrate cooperation with Choices for four consecutive weeks before
benefits are restored. Thus at a minimum recipients lose one full month of benefits.
Under both full and partial family sanctions, recipients can avoid sanctions if they show
good cause for failing to comply with work rules. Good cause, as defined by the law,
includes a temporary illness or incapacitation, court appearance, caring for a physically or
mentally disabled household member, lack of transportation or child care, an absence of
support services, an individual or family crisis or family circumstance (including substance
abuse, mental health, or disability-related issues), and domestic violence (40 Texas
Administrative Code § 811.16(c), 2004). Recipients can also obtain exemptions from the
work rules based on age (more than 60 years), pregnancy, disability, and caring for a child
less than 1 year or a disabled household member. The Texas Health and Human Services
Commission is responsible for determining exemptions to the work rules and for imple-
menting sanctions, including good cause determinations, based on information provided by
local and independent Choices programs.
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What Reasons Did Clients Provide for Not Complying With Work 
Rules Under Both the Full and Partial Sanction Regimes?
Sanctions are based on the premise that recipients make rational decisions on the costs
and benefits of welfare (Rector, 1993). Under partial sanctions recipients may calculate that
not complying with intrusive and burdensome work rules offsets the reduction in their
grant. They may rationally choose less money in exchange for not having to attend work
activities. In contrast, recipients have more incentive to avoid full family sanctions. Unlike
partially sanctioned families, whose children remain on public assistance rolls, the conse-
quences are a full loss of benefits. Presumably recipients would try harder to avoid a full
family sanction and would be less likely to let barriers, such as family problems, poor
health, and logistical or situational problems, interfere with compliance. They would also
be more likely to track notices to make sure appointments were not missed. On the other
hand, if clients were unable to surmount such barriers and obstacles, despite the harsher
consequences of the full family sanction, their reasons for not complying would likely be
similar under both sanction regimes.
With one exception discussed below, clients’ reasons for not complying with the work
rules were similar under the partial and full sanction regimes (Table 2). In the urban/suburban
region the most common reason for noncompliance was a family obstacle or situational
challenge, such as a temporary illness, ill family member, transportation, or child care prob-
lems. Such obstacles were cited by 34% of the partially sanctioned and 39% of the fully
sanctioned. The second most common reason was a medical or other exemption, cited by
31% of the partially sanctioned and 34% of the fully sanctioned. The percentage of recipi-
ents who claimed they did not receive notice was virtually identical, at 22% (partially sanc-
tioned) and 21% (fully sanctioned). t Tests (two tailed) were conducted to determine whether
these differences between partial and full sanctioned recipients were statistically significant.
A two-tailed t test was used because it is a more rigorous test designed to capture changes





Reason Partial Full t Test Partial Full t Test
Scheduling conflict with 13% 8% t = 1.2 (83 df), 16% 7% t = 1.48 (103 df),
work or school p > .11 p > .07
Agency error 15% 21% t = −.84 (57 df), 18% 15% t = .24 (87 df),
p > .8 p > .40
Family obstacles; situational 34% 39% t = −1.2 (59 df), 13% 18% t = −.39 (79 df),
challenges p > .89 p > .65
Nonreceipt of notice of date 22% 21% t = .47 (67 df), 41% 33% t = .38 (85 df),
of appointment p > .31 p > .35
Medical or other exemption 31% 34% t =.17 (64 df), 18% 49% t = −3.25 (68 df),
p > .43 p > .99
Note: df, degree of freedom. Percentages total more than 100% because some clients cited multiple reasons.
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In the rural region, a lack of notice was the most common reason cited by both groups
(41% for the partially sanctioned and 33% of the fully sanctioned). The biggest change in the
rural region after the switch to a full family sanction was the percentage of recipients claim-
ing a medical exemption, increasing from 18% to 49%. A two-tailed t test confirmed this was
statistically significant (p < .01). Family obstacles or situational challenges remained rela-
tively constant, at 13% for the partially sanctioned and 18% for the fully sanctioned. Sixteen
percent of the partially sanctioned reported scheduling conflicts, compared with 7% of the
fully sanctioned, the latter difference was marginally statistically significant (p < .07).
In comparing the rural and urban/suburban regions, rural recipients were more likely to
claim a lack of notice of their appointment, whereas urban/suburban recipients were more
likely to cite family obstacles or situational challenges. The reason for this is unclear.
Logistical problems such as transportation are usually more pronounced in rural areas,
whereas lack of notice is typically a problem in poor urban neighborhoods with multiple
family dwellings and often-defective mailboxes.
Thus, as Texas shifted from partial to full family sanctions the reasons for noncompli-
ance remained fairly stable, with the exception of medical exemptions in the rural region.
This suggests that although sanction incentives changed, recipients’ reasons and circumstances
surrounding their noncompliance did not. As recipients reported, family obstacles and situ-
ational challenges were still a barrier to compliance, as was a lack of notice of work appoint-
ments. On the other hand, the increase in medical exemption claims in the rural region may
reflect recipients’ attempts to protect themselves from the harsher consequences of a full
family sanction by claiming an exemption. Overall, the percentage of medical exemptions
in Texas nearly doubled from 2002 to 2004, from 9.8% to 18.2% (Table 3). The increased
number of appeals involving exemptions in the rural region may have reflected this trend,
with the rural region lagging behind in granting them.
One possible reason for the consistency between regimes may lie in the similarity of the
welfare populations in both years. Although Texas’s welfare caseload declined 18% between
the 2 years studied, 2002 and 2004 (from 129,937 to 106,329 families), the characteristics of
recipients remained fairly stable and was the same mix of disadvantaged and less disadvan-
taged recipients (Table 3). The percentage of recipients with less than a high school diploma
remained similar at 52.8% in 2002 and 50.4% in 2004. Ethnic composition also remained
virtually identical. African American’s made up 35.1% of the rolls in 2002 and 36.3% in 2004,
whereas the percentage of Hispanics was 42.6% and 41.3%, respectively. The percentage of
disabled adults remained minor and constant, at 0.5% in 2002 and 0.6% in 2004.
The percentage of adults engaged in work activities increased from 26.1% to 41.5%, and
the percentage of adults employed also increased from 27.4% to 34.5% (Texas Workforce
Investment Council, 2006). However, as reported by Kauff et al. (2007) in their study of
Texas’s sanction policies, work participation rates declined over time to a rate similar to the
partial sanction regime. They also concluded that it was not possible to determine whether
the increase in employment and work participation rates were attributable to changes in
sanction policy or other policy or economic changes. Medical exemptions did double, sug-
gesting, as indicated above, that at least some of the most disadvantaged recipients were
protected from full family sanctions through the exemption process.
The sanctioning rate in the urban region remained the same at 4.5% in 2002 and 2004,
indicating that workers’ willingness to sanction did not change after full family sanctions
Lens / Implementing Full and Partial Work Sanctions 295
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were imposed. (The sanction rate was determined by dividing the average monthly number
of sanctions by the average monthly caseload.) In the rural region, the sanctioning rate
decreased from 4% to 2.2%, perhaps indicating less willingness to sanction.
In sum, full and partially sanctioned recipients were very similar in their reasons for non-
compliance. Both groups cited family obstacles and situational challenges or lack of notice
as the primary reasons for their noncompliance. This finding is consistent with previous
studies discussed above, that sanctioned recipients are more disadvantaged, have more
obstacles to work than nonsanctioned recipients, and are often unaware they have been
sanctioned. These findings suggest that some recipients are unable to overcome personal,
situational, and other obstacles under either sanctioning regime. In other words, if recipients’
reasons for noncompliance are an inability, and not an unwillingness, to work, compliance
will remain a problem under both full and partial sanction regimes.
How are Sanctions Applied on the Front Lines, and Do Workers 
Administer Full Family Sanctions Differently Than Partial Sanctions?
The application of sanctions involves a mix of rules and discretion. Rules or standard oper-
ating procedures may direct workers to sanction recipients for a specific infraction, such as a
missed meeting. But workers can use their discretion in several ways. One way is to give
Table 3
Selected Characteristics of TANF Recipients, Fiscal Years 2002 and 2004
2002 2004
Number of TANF families receiving assistance 129,937 106,329
Age of adult recipient
20-29 years 50.8% 47.6%
30-39 years 26.2% 28.5%
Ethnicity of adult recipient
African American 35.1% 36.3%
Hispanic 42.6% 41.3%
White 21.3% 21.7%
Marital status, single 59% 62.6%
Number of months receiving assistance 23.6 26.6
TANF adults receiving disability benefits 0.5% 0.6%
Adult recipients educational levels, less than high school 52.8% 50.4%*
Adult recipients exempt from work rules due to disability/other 9.8% 18.2%
Distribution of recipient children 5 and under 47.8% 44.6%
Adults participating in work activities 26% 41.5%
Adult recipients employed 27.4% 34.5%
Adult recipients unemployed, looking for work 38.6% 41.1%
Adult recipients not in labor force, not looking for work 34% 24.4%
Source: Data compiled from U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Family Assistance for
Children and Families, TANF Sixth Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2002; U.S Department of Health
and Human Services, Office of Family Assistance for Children and Families, Characteristics and Financial
Circumstances of TANF Recipients for Fiscal Year 2004.
a. Data provided by Lynette Preece, Research Specialist, Strategic Decision Support, Texas Health and Human
Services Commission.
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recipients additional opportunities to meet their obligations. There was evidence of both in the
partial and full sanction hearing data. Workers sometimes sanctioned recipients after the first
offense. At other times workers imposed sanctions after a string of rescheduled or neglected
appointments. In some cases sanctions were entered days after the infraction. In other cases
they were entered weeks or months later after several contacts with the recipient.
Another way workers exercise their discretion is in their assessment of clients’ reasons
for not complying. Although assessing good cause was always a part of the sanctioning
process, under the full family sanction regime there was more of an opportunity to do so.
Under the partial sanction regime, local workforce boards had considerable flexibility when
imposing partial sanctions. Under full family sanctions local workforce boards maintained
that flexibility, but were also required to make a “timely and reasonable attempt” (as
defined by the local workforce board) to contact the family to determine the reason for non-
cooperation before initiating a penalty (Texas Workforce Commission, 2004).
Presumably sanctions would be applied more carefully because of the harsher conse-
quences and new procedural safeguards for full family sanctions. However, recipient suc-
cess rates at hearings were virtually identical in the rural region for full and partial family
sanctions, at 49% and 48%, respectively (Table 1). In the urban/suburban region, recipient
success rates declined from 48% to 36%, although the decline was not because of fewer
errors. As reported by the agency, it was more willing to settle cases and withdraw the sanc-
tion when recipients appealed under the full sanction regime. Hence, success rates were still
high and caseworkers were still making errors at similar rates (according to fair hearing
outcomes) in the application of full family sanctions.
Workers also continued to assess clients’ reasons for not complying in similar ways. As
described next, under both the partial and full sanction regimes, and in both the urban/
suburban and rural regions, the fair hearing data revealed similar evidence of workers
discounting client’s explanations or failing to fully consider them.
Partial sanction findings. In the author’s (Lens, 2006) earlier study, as noted above, three
characteristics of an eligibility-compliance culture were found in the fair hearing data on
partial sanctions. First, workers failed to fully assess exemptions from the work rules.
Problems with the assessment process occurred in 40 (out of 178) cases or 22% of the par-
tial sanction cases, with 33 cases in the urban/suburban region and 7 in the rural region.
Illustrative cases included workers who missed cues contained in case records of a disabil-
ity or did not give recipients time to secure medical documentation. When documentation
was provided it was parsed negatively. For example, in one case reversed by the hearing
officer, the client’s physician indicated she had been disabled for the past 4 years and was
still disabled; because the physician did not indicate how long the disability would last, she
was deemed employable. These faulty procedures and evaluations led to the reduction of
aid to clients entitled to exemptions. Bureaucratic disentitlement, or the denial of aid to other-
wise eligible people, often through paper-processing mistakes, is characteristic of an
eligibility–compliance culture.
Second, workers failed to fully assess, or construed narrowly, clients’ reasons for not com-
plying with the work rules. This occurred in 72% of the cases or 129 cases (81 in the
urban/suburban region and 48 in the rural region). (Overall, frequency counts sum more than
n because more than one code could be applied to each case.) Recipients were sanctioned
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quickly and routinely, without evaluating their willingness to work. Thus, for example, work-
ers automatically entered sanctions into the system a few minutes after a recipient’s appoint-
ment time, neglecting to reverse it when the recipient showed up a few minutes later. Personal
and situational obstacles to work, such as a lack of transportation or child care, sick children,
or unstable living arrangements, were overlooked or ignored. It was difficult for clients to
reach workers, and even workers had difficulty reversing conceded errors. Imposing sanctions
became a paper-processing task, with workers substituting the client’s overt performance—
did he or she attend a work activity—for more complex assessments of work efforts.
Third, workers’ application of sanctions sometimes subverted policy goals. This occurred
in 17% or 30 of the cases (19 in the urban/suburban region and 11 in the rural region). For
example, attendance at school or even a job was not always considered a reason for missing
a Choices meeting. Requests to schedule such meetings when the client was not working
or attending school were denied. Workers sometimes felt constrained by the rules, in one
case arguing on behalf of the client at a fair hearing that although she performed superbly in
her assigned educational activity, they had no choice but to sanction her when she was unable
to find a job in her rural community with few job opportunities. (The sanction was reversed.)
Such goal displacement is common in eligibility-compliance cultures, where the focus is
often on the rules and not their underlying purpose.
Full sanction findings. These practices persisted under the full family sanction regime.
As under the partial sanction regime, workers in both regions failed to fully explore work
exemptions. Problems in the assessment process occurred in 46% of the cases, or 36 out of
77 cases (15 in the urban/suburban region and 21 in the rural region). The latter represents
a significant increase in this category compared with the partial sanction cases, consistent
with the increased number of recipients in the rural region claiming a medical exemption
in the fair hearing data. For example, in a case in the urban/suburban region reversed by the
hearing officer, the recipient submitted documentation stating that she had been in a car
accident and could not work; yet this information was ignored. In another case, the recipi-
ent was needed at home to care for her husband who was in danger of paralysis from recent
neck surgery. The hearing officer found that the “recipient was not attempting to get out of
participating, but [was] not able to participate due to the surgery and medical conditions of
her spouse.”
Similar cases of ignored or overlooked exemptions occurred in the rural region. In one
case, the recipient had spent part of the year in a state of coma, but was sanctioned even
though she had submitted medical documentation. In another case, the agency sanctioned
a disabled recipient after the worker called her home and was told—falsely—by her
mother-in-law, who suffers from Alzheimer’s, that “she had gone up north to work.” In both
cases, the hearing officer reversed the sanctions.
As under the partial sanction regime, there was evidence workers failed to assess, or con-
strued narrowly, clients’ reasons for not complying with the work rules. This occurred in
71%, or 55 out of 77 cases (30 cases in the urban/suburban region and 25 in the rural
region). One way this manifested was through overly rigid documentation demands and
excessive proceduralism. For example, in a case in the rural region reversed by the hearing
officer the recipient had submitted a form in December indicating she was needed at home
to care for a disabled child. The form was rejected because it did not state that the child’s
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condition was permanent. The recipient then submitted a second form in January clarifying
the condition was permanent. The agency refused to apply the form retroactively, sanc-
tioning her for the December violation, but not the next month.
An emphasis on the clerical task of sanctioning rather than its substantive goals resulted
in sometimes inflexible and arbitrary demands. In an illustrative example from the
urban/suburban region, the recipient was in the midst of moving when a letter was sent
advising her of an orientation appointment. She received the letter a week after the appoint-
ment date because it was sent to her old address. She called her worker the day she received
the letter and was advised to attend an orientation at an office closer to her new home. Four
days later she called the new office and made an appointment for 4 days hence, and
attended it. Although she rescheduled the missed orientation within two weeks of the orig-
inal date, and was participating in work activities, she was still sanctioned. The agency
refused to withdraw the sanction because the recipient had waited 4 days to reschedule the
orientation. The hearing officer concurred, noting that it had taken the recipient 3½ weeks
after her move to begin full participation. Neither the agency nor the hearing officer directly
questioned the recipient’s willingness to comply, but only the speed with which she
arranged appointments, setting arguably arbitrary deadlines.
In another illustrative case in the urban/suburban region, form similarly took precedence
over substance. The recipient arrived at an appointment 8 min late according to her and 15
min late according to the agency. She was refused entry into the meeting, which she then
rescheduled for later that week and attended. Although the agency then deemed her to be
cooperating she was sanctioned for the original failure to appear timely. Much of the hear-
ing focused on whether the recipient was 8 or 15 min late, with the recipient acknowledging
that her car clock could have been wrong. The sanction was upheld by the hearing officer,
who found that the “failure to make certain your clock is working is not considered good
cause for failing to appear on time for a scheduled appointment with the agency.”
The agency also failed to fully evaluate family obstacles and situational challenges to
work, such as a lack of transportation or child care, sick children, or unstable living arrange-
ments. For example, in a case reversed in the urban/suburban region, the recipient was caring
for a child with cerebral palsy, although living in a shelter and without transportation. The
agency acknowledged at the hearing that they were aware of all these problems and had
granted good cause for a subsequent appointment but still imposed a sanction. The hearing
officer reversed the sanction, finding that the recipient had a reasonable explanation for not
keeping the appointment. Another recipient, whose sanction was not reversed, explained that
she did not successfully complete her job search hours because of unreliable transportation,
difficulty understanding English, and a lack of work experience. Other explanations from
recipients, including doctor’s appointments for asthmatic children, food poisoning that
required hospitalization, and a daughter’s fractured ankle, were rejected, with hearing officers
more unlikely under the full family sanction regime to reverse these cases.
There were few cases in the category “administering sanctions in a manner inconsistent
with policy goals,” with only 6% of the cases falling in this category (two cases in the
urban/suburban region and three in the rural region). As described above, included in this
category were cases where a recipient was working or attending school when sanctioned.
In one case from the rural region, the recipient was enrolled full-time in an approved clinical
course of study when she missed a work appointment. The sanction was reversed.
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Discussion and Implications
Under both the full and partial sanction regimes, and in both the urban/suburban and
rural regions, workers chose a punitive approach to sanctions. They narrowly applied the
good cause exception, rejecting or overlooking obstacles to work, with workers recasting
clients’ explanations as excuses. Minor work violations, overlooked in the workplace, were
conflated. Workers chose to sanction clients for trivial reasons, such as coming 15 min late
to a meeting subsequently attended or waiting 4 days to reschedule an appointment.
Documentation provided by clients to prove work exemptions was parsed negatively, with
workers treating minor discrepancies or deviations in wording as major omissions.
Although this study is limited to examining only those sanctions disputed by clients
through the hearing process, the findings shed light on the ways in which workers exercise
their discretion when sanctioning. The choices made by workers represent a distinct set of
service technologies, characteristic of agencies whose clientele, like welfare recipients, are
stigmatized and held in low esteem (Hasenfeld, 2000; Hasenfeld & Weaver, 1996; Schneider
& Ingram, 1993). Discretion takes on a particular form in such cultures. It is often exercised
negatively, as workers resort to “moral typifications” (Handler, 2004, p. 83) that paints most,
if not all, recipients as undeserving of aid. As Hasenfeld (2000, p. 333) explains, “in such
organizations ideologies toward the clients tend to be punitive . . . and the service technol-
ogy is highly routinized and bureaucratized.” Workers responsible for numerous clients,
most of whom they view as deficient, operate from a default position of distrust.
The incentives built into the law, in the form of mandated work participation rates and
the pressure to reduce caseloads, also encourage workers to adopt certain coping strategies.
Much of the welfare bureaucracy is devoted to sanctioning and monitoring compliance with
work rules, under both partial and full family sanctioning regimes. Time spent on tracking
and documenting work activities means less time for the personalized case management
required to encourage work and resolve barriers (Kauff et al., 2007). As Brodkin (2006a)
explains, in such environments, where caseworkers need to “meet the numbers,” “informal
strategies of simplification, burden-shifting, goal displacement, categorization, and redefi-
nition that could enhance processing efficiency are likely to occur” (p. 11). This means
ignoring or overlooking personal barriers, and redefining clients as “problem clients” rather
than “clients with a problem” (Brodkin, 2006a, p. 14).
Sanctions have been described as a motivational tool “for encouraging TANF recipients
who might not be inclined to participate in work activities to do so” (Kauff et al., 2007,
p. 1). However, as this study demonstrates, they can become unmoored from this purpose
and used to penalize clients instead. Such an approach may work at cross-purposes to welfare
reform. As Kane and Bane (1994) observed of past efforts to encourage self-sufficiency,
“the story of these efforts is one of conflicts between the eligibility-compliance culture and
the culture of self-sufficiency” (p. 20). Substantial resources have gone into creating a cul-
ture of self-sufficiency. Funding has increased for support service and offices reorganized
to emphasize work. Sanctions imposed to punish clients rather than motivate them can under-
mine these efforts. As Schott, Greenstein, and Primus (1999) observe, sanctions terminate
recipients’ connections to work activities and support services, making it harder to prepare
recipients for work. Imposing sanctions for minor violations, or instead of addressing
obstacles, can increase financial hardship, disrupt work activities, and create unnecessary
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obstacles. This is especially true under a full family sanction regime, where the entire family
is cut off from aid.
Recent changes under the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 provide incentives for impos-
ing full family sanctions, and to impose them quickly and more frequently. More recipients
are now included in the calculation of work participation rates, thus encouraging the use of
sanctions, and especially full family sanctions, to motivate them to comply. Sanctioned
clients are also removed from the calculation of participation rates, making it easier to meet
the requirements (Kauff et al., 2007). This may result in increased sanctioning of the kind
described in this study.
In recognition of the harm caused by erroneous or ill-advised sanctions, many offices
have implemented procedural safeguards. These include, for example, multiple written
notices, home visits, and conciliation procedures, where barriers to work are explored and
clients given an opportunity to explain their noncompliance (Kauff et al., 2007). Such pro-
cedures, however well-defined on paper, add another layer of bureaucracy and are suscep-
tible to the same types of practices described herein. Formal notifications multiplied do not
correct their inherent deficiencies as way of reaching clients. Home visits, and even concili-
ation procedures, may replicate, and even exacerbate, the more negative aspects of worker–
client interactions. For example, in a study conducted by the author, recipients described
the conciliation procedures used to resolve sanctions as less helpful than their initial meet-
ings with workers (Lens, 2007).
Another approach would be to retrain workers to direct their discretion differently. As
scholars have noted, workers respond to incentives; for example, under quality control in
the 1980s workers penalized for giving clients too much, and not too little, erred on the side
of stringency (Brodkin, 1986). Workers could be trained to view sanctions as a last resort
and as reflective of their performance, not just their clients. Those workers who avoided
sanctions and found other ways to maintain clients’ engagement in work activities (through
support services, individualized attention, and so forth) would be rewarded. Frequent sanc-
tioning would serve as an error signal requiring additional training and reorientation toward
sanctioning. Such an approach emphasizes the evaluative over the clerical and highlights
the complexity of encouraging self-sufficiency. It also stresses the need for workers, as well
as clients, to function differently in the culture of self-sufficiency.
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